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Whose Nation? Ethnographic Enquiry in 
Cultural Discourses of Belonging Since the 80s
誰的家國？從民族詖角度看八十年代以來有關認同問題的文化論述
Tibet, in Zhaxi Dawa's hands, permanently defies all hermeneutic efforts, because 
it is an endless enigma, an eternal mystery.
Wang Fei1
The Spectre of Minority Discourse
Concepts of culture, in our contemporary globalizing world, very often stress the 
idea of boundaries. It looks as if, wkh an increasing facilitation of traffic and commu- 
nication across geographical boundaries and the rapidly growing knowledge about 
our distant others， traditional imaginary distinctions are not only far from experienc- 
ing a natural devaluation, but, on the contrary, also resurfacing with an ever stronger 
intensity. This paradoxical development is currently being scrutinized by a number 
of academic scholars as well as cultural critics, and at the same time being explored 
aesthetically by many producers in the cultural field. Race, time and location have 
become key notions in revisionist reconstructions of a world history that is perceived
1 Wang Fei 王緋, "Mohuan yu huangdan: zuan zai Zhaxi Dawa shouxinr li de Xizang1 魔幻與荒誕:攥在扎西達娃 
手心兒裡的西藏[Magic and Fantastic: Reprinting the Tibet in the Palm of Zhaxi Dawa],久/za叩, y/nm/su/j/L/e 西 
藏，隱秘歲月[T/bef, 77ieH/_den C/roi/c]， by Zhaxi Dawa (Wuhan: Chang jiang chu ban she, 1993) 387-99,
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to consist of not one, but several different, interacting local and transnational 
modernities. Frank Dikotter has drawn our attention to the importance of the concept 
of race since the earliest configurations of Chinese nationalism.2 Benedict Anderson, 
in his study of nationalism as a pseudo-religious ideology based on a certain (flexible) 
grand narrative that is revered by all or the majority of those people who consider 
themselves as members of one community, has argued that nation-building mainly 
rests upon the successful integration of changing perceptions of reality by means of 
creative historical representation. Along with Ernest Renan3 he is convinced that much 
depends on a persuasive choice of things to remember and things to forget — the 
spookiness, or spectrality, of which principle he indicated by concluding his foreword 
to the German edition of his monograph with the perplexing date of "Halloween 1987".4 
Jan Assmann, in his study of the formation of concepts of collective identity in the 
early civilizations of Egypt, Israel and Greece, has demonstrated how communities 
develop and canonize certain tropes of self-description according to recurring patterns 
in their historical experience. The Jewish trope of the exodus, that was formed be­
tween 722 BCE and 70 CE as a result of six successive situations of schism and 
deportation, illustrates well how individual memories have to go through a long pro­
cess of spatialization, de~individualization, forgetting, and continuous narration in order 
to become a constitutive part of the community's cultural memory.5 Homi Bhabha 
argues for a dynamic inclusion of the displaced, or forgotten histories of nations. His 
distinction between two contesting temporalities in the narrative production of the 
nation, namely the ,rcontinuist, accumulative temporality of the pedagogical, and the 
repetitious， recursive strategy of the performative,'， has made us aware of a ”concep_ 
tual ambivalence of modern society/' which is a source of anxiety to the subjects be­
cause it seemingly engenders a continuous, fundamental threat of disintegration.6
2 "Race and nation overlapped in the term m/nzu 民族, The constant juxtaposition of g⑷國, 'country,' to 叩 
種, ’race,1 in set phrases like ’love th e 「ace and love the country’ 愛種愛國[sic]), 〇「 ’national 
tomdaries and racial bomdaries' (pu〇y/e才〇ng‘/e 國界種界[sic]) also contributed to the integration of the
of race into the nationalist vision. The guo, as one nationalist explained, was not merely a geographical expression: 
it had a racial connotation, Even Yan Fu 嚴復 publicly declared that 'the sentiment of patriotism is rooted in racial 
nature.'" See Frank Dikotter, The Discourse o f Race in Modern China (Stanford; Stanford University Press, 1992) 
108-110.
3 Ernest Renan, "Qu'est~ce qu'une nation ? f, [What is a Nation ?], CEuvres Comp/etes de Ernest denari, vol,1 
(Paris; Calmann-Levy, 1947-61) 887-906.
4 Benedict Anderson, Die Erf'indung der Nation. Zur Karriere dries foigenreichen Konzepts [Imagined Communities] 
(New York: Campus, 1996) 10.
5 Jan Assmann, Das kulturelle Gedachtnis. Schrift, Erinnerung undpoiitische Identitat in fruhen Hochkulturen [Cultural 
Memory. Script, Recollection and Political Identities in Early High Cultures] (Munchen: Beck, 1999) 200 f,
Minority discourses， as decisive parts of the performative process of nation-building， 
reveal best that
[the] problem is not simply the "selfhood" of the nation as opposed to the otherness of 
other nations. We are confronted with the nation split within itself, articulating the 
heterogeneity of its population. The barred Nation It/Sel£ alienated from its eternal 
self-generation, becomes a liminal signifying space that is internally marked by the 
discourses of minorities, the heterogeneous histories o f contending peoples, antagonis­
tic authorities and tense locations of cultural difference.6 7
While Ulrich Beck only recently has stressed the fundamental threat to territorial 
concepts of identity that emanate from cultural difference writ large by the emergent 
libidinal forces of globalization,8 Bhabha more optimistically asks questions about the 
practical and theoretical implications of unsubdued minority discourses. His attitude 
points to newness as a chance, as well as a demand, for contemporary nations to thor­
oughly revise their outdated categories of social order. An open acknowledgment of 
internal cultural differences with the ensuing reconfigurations of cultural and politi­
cal forms of authority according to him does not necessarily threaten, but possibly 
empowers collective identities. There is a colourful side to spectres, which he believes 
to be enacted in progressive cultural production.
Proceeding from the above-mentioned assumptions about how historically grown 
concepts of collective selfhood can predetermine a community's attitude towards cul­
tural change, I aim to trace, in a preliminary survey of ethnographic approaches in 
films and fiction of Chinese storytellers since the mid-80s, a revisionist discourse of 
cultural identity that effectively undertakes to negotiate between persistent traditional 
distinctions and modern boundary transgressions. If the above-cited literary critic Wang 
Fei's well-intended effort to erase the predominance of atavistic mythologies and reli­
gions in Zhaxi Dawa's Tibetan tales, which in my view are employed as the determin­
ing constituents of a vexed local modernity, lastly comes to a dead end in his conclu- 
sion about the eternally mysterious character of that specific ethnic other, this might 
be due to a rather limited perspective. I will argue that Zhaxi Dawa's tales, once posi­
6 Homi Bhabha, The Location o f Culture (London, New York: Routledge, 1994) 145 f.
7 Ibid, 148f.
8 Ulrich Beck, f,Das Eigene, das Fremde und die Kommunikationsstrome. Identitaten im Zeita lter der 
Informationsgeseilschaf1 [丁he Own, the Alien and Communication Streams. Identities in the Age of the Information 
Society], NeueZurcherZeitung [NewZurich Newspaper] nr. 261,11 October 2003:27 .
tioned within both global cultural theories and a variety of local representations of 
ethnic 一 or rural — otherness, reveal a potential of innovation that rests not on mod­
ernist exclusion, but on a self-conscious employment of archaic symbolism as a neces­
sary epistemic tool. In accordance with Homi Bhabha's observation concerning the 
ambivalent coexistence of both pedagogical and performative signifying strategies, 
the return to such anachronistic narrative strategies can be explained as supporting 
the authors' efforts to give a voice to their community's muted, subalternized subjects, 
and thereby establish new forms of transcultural communication. From this poetic 
strategy, the vision of a new world order — utopian yet distinctly not radical — can 
be derived.
Functions of the Ethnic 〇the「 in Historical and Contemporary Communities
Ethnographic description of the strange peoples at the kingdom's, or empire's, 
margins traditionally was the task of religious specialists, and later the bureaucratic 
elite. While we still do not and probably will never know a lot about how much of the 
oldest descriptions of the territorial peripheries and their respective populations was 
based on what kinds of cultural contact, we meanwhile did gain some clearer ideas 
about the organization, functions and rationalizing strategies of early cosmographic 
anomaly accounts.9 While natural manifestations of the divine were believed predomi­
nantly to dwell in hidden spaces at the margins of, or beyond, the settled territory, the 
settling communities defined themselves by means of a paradigm of cultural 
superiority, that is, by measurement of the political centre's distance from the sur- 
rounding "barbarians” with their unrefined cultural practices. The raw and the cooked， 
the naked man-eater with dishevelled hair versus the well-mannered gentleman, such 
kind of cultural identity construction in binomic oppositions is far from being unique 
to the Chinese civilization. Therefore, it is all the more interesting to investigate the 
geohistorical effects of such basic anthropological categories— effects, which, in con­
trast to the basic categories of cultural identity, are more locally specific. In the Chi­
nese case, the idea of a loose control over, and support for the maintenance of social 
order in the neighbouring communities, was based on the imperial tribute system.10 
Until the takeover of the Qing, there was little appetite for marvellous possessions like
9 Robert F. Campany, Strange Writing: Anomaly Accounts in Early Medieval China (New York; State University of 
New York Press, 1992).
10 For quick reference, see the internet history course by Marilyn Levine and Susanne Weigelin-Schwiedrzik, "Unit 
3: The Chinese System of Tribute," China in the Twentieth Century ZS December Z003 < http://vwvw.lcsc.edu/ 
modernchina/directory.htin>. The list of publications is still under construction,
in the Western imperialist appropriation of ethnic others, which had legitimated its 
violence by means of Christian universalism.11 A clash of civilizations,12 which hap­
pened after the Ming-Qing transition, as Western merchants and missionaries started 
to establish their business along the Chinese coast， has done great harm to 仕le develop- 
ment of rational concepts of alterity, leading to long-lived negative stereotypes based 
on mutual resentment. After the postcolonialist shift of paradigm, while we are cor­
recting the outdated vernaculars of ourselves and the various alterities out there in 
academic debates, our common conception of Chinese society is still disturbed by the 
cliche of a centralized, homogenous and static entity stemming from nineteenth cen­
tury literary orientalism.
It would of course at present appear more than premature to outline the role and 
importance of past forms of minority discourses, oral histories, and related phenom­
ena of secession, decentralization and fragmentation in Chinese history. However, some 
scattered observations might give an idea about the multifunctionality of dynastic 
concepts of alterity. From the perspective of the empire's approaches to its border 
populations， empirical cultural difference was not an object of serious inquiry until 
quite late. Likewise, the centre's homogenizing efforts usually did not reach very far. 
No matter, whether a basically Daoist project of tributary accumulation of strange 
objects that held them as representatives of the world's magic powers in antiquity, or 
a Confucian civilizing project that was enacted as punitive dissemination of degraded 
officials to the empire's peripheries’ are taken into account’ it can safely be said that 
there was encouragement, but certainly no urge to assimilate or Han-ify the alien 
cultures. While， up to the Ming, Daoist missionaries would occasionally contribute to 
the empire's glory by making acolytes among the minority peoples in remote moun­
tain areas, influential (post-Confucian?) members of the late Ming gentry conversely 
began to investigate the geographies and histories of the borderlands in terms of their 
moral superiority over a political centre that was seen by them as totally dysfunctional 
and degenerate. For the sake of cosmological balance, they travelled to the margins in 
order to save and accumulate the moral power from out there.13
Since the formation of a modern nation-state, an urge to fully integrate the vari-
11 Stephen Greenblatt, Marvellous Possessions. The Wonder o f the New World (Oxford; Clarendon Press, 1992),
12 Samuel R Huntington, The Clash o f CiviUzations and the Remaking o f World Order (New York: Touchstone, 
1997).
13 I have attempted a detailed analysis of the late Ming discourse on travel, boundaries and moral landscape 
elsewhere. See Andrea Riemenschnitter, "Traveler's Vocation: Xu Xiake and his Excursion to the Southwestern 
Frontier," Political Frontiers, Ethnic Boundaries, and Human Geographies in Chinese History, eds, Nicola Di Cosmo 
and Don Wyatt (London & New York: Routledge Curzon, 2003) 286-323,
ous hinterland communities and minority peoples by means of cultural Han-ification14 
has been felt strongly by representatives of political as well as intellectual elites. Think­
ers of both the modernist and conservative factions competed in their attempts to 
build a new homogenous cultural imaginary that could be implemented as the founda­
tion of a Chinese nation. A  discourse of race was derived from, among other sources, 
the Western historical, anthropological and economic literature that was translated 
into Chinese during the late 19th century and up to the contemporary period.15 In his 
influential series of lectures Sanmin zhuyi ( The Three Principles o f the
People) (1897-1920), Sun Yat-sen classified the population as belonging to five ethnic 
groups, namely, the Han majority and the Man (Manzhu), M eng f t  (Mongol), Hui 
(Muslim) and Zang ^  (Tibetan) minorities. By inventing a simple pattern of five 
national families, he hoped to create a sense of belonging from Han down to the most 
isolated tribal communities. Maoism, in accordance with the Marxist principle of privi­
leging the historical agency of the nation's subaltern subjects, first encouraged the 
cultivation of tribal traditions, but later adopted Sun's guidelines and denounced mi- 
nority beliefs and customs as backward, superstitious and reactionary. By making use 
of the signs of woman， child and the senile， the minorities usually were represented by 
the Communist Party's chief ideologues as awaiting Han civilization in the three re­
spective discursive frames of the sexual, the pedagogical and the historical.16
Today, among international ethnographers who show an interest in the dialogue 
between majority and minority cultures, four different categories of contemporary 
Chinese perceptions of ethnic alterity are considered most relevant，namely， the exotic- 
female-primitive, the exotic-familiar, the rebellious and the emerging self-confident 
native. The state still profits from maintaining Republican-Marxist images of the eth­
nic other as colourfully exotic, female and primitive. After the Maoist agenda of revo­
lutionary salvation had run its course, this same concept later served as both a disci- 
plining and deficiency-compensating model towards Han subjects,17 and advertisement 
for a major national attraction to be sold to foreign tourists.18 Popular images about the
14 See Prasenjit Duara, "Transnationalism and the Challenge to National Histories," Rethinking American History in 
a Global Age ed, Thomas Bender (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1992); and Rescuing 
History from the Nation: Questioning Narratives o f Modern China (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996),
15 Frank Dikotter, The Discourse o f Race in Modern China (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1992),
16 For a good survey of bibliographical references for the history and politics of representation of Chinese minorities 
see Ch/呢se Waf/bra/ 加/’c M ‘即"f/es Proyramme, 2001, Centre for Chinese Studies, University of Hawaii, 16 
August 2004 < http://chinesestudies.hawaii.edu/minorities/library.php>,
17 Dru Gladney "Representing Nationality in China; Refiguring Majority/Minority Identities," 10 April 2003 <vwwv, 
hawaii/dru/exotic.htm>.
underdeveloped rural hinterland communities include the trope of sinaojin 
(the dead brains) for the exotic familiarity of peasants who failed to accmnulate wealth 
in response to the Party's capitalist campaigns,18 9 and (the fear of) tribal insurgency.20 
During a period of unprecedented financial as well as ideological support brought 
about by emergent transnational historical forces like NGOs, tourism and migration, 
the Tibetan and several other privileged ethnic communities have begun to self-confi- 
dently engage in a genuine dialogue with Han as well as other modern cultures.21 Traces
of this emergent phenomenon of speaking and writing back have been noticed and 
positively responded to by the zhiqing ^  (young intellectual) generation of Han 
producers in the cultural field.
The Cultural Turn of the 80s
On account of their own biographical experience of precarious subalternization 
during the radical Maoist years, these members of the Han intelligentsia had several 
good reasons to radically question the Party's signifying strategy of the minorities as 
female, exotic others of the Han self. Writers as well as filmmakers who as zhiqinghad 
been sent into the wilderness to learn from the peasants did not fail to see the parallels 
between their own compulsory distant journeys and the former imperial politics of 
banishment of officials too outspokenly critical. Thus, returning from their various 
countryside abodes, the banned urban youth realized how little newness was in Maoist 
revolutionary politics.22 When they were finally allowed to return to the cities, the tra­
ditional discourse of ethnic otherness took on a new twist with the so-called xun^en 
•尋根運動 (search for roots movement). In order to mend the damage inflicted 
by the Maoist invention of a new culture, they made efforts to unearth the vitality of
18 Todd Munson, "Selling China: www,cnta.com and Cultural Nationalism/' 10 April 2003 <v^vwa!banyedu/jmmh/ 
vol2no1/chinaweb.html>,
19 Liu Xin, in One's Own Shadow: An Ethnographic Account o f the Condition o f Post-Reform Rural China (Berkeley; 
University of California Press, 2000),
20 Susuan Blum and Lionel Jensen, eds. China Off Center. Mapping the Margins o f the Middle Kingdom (Honolulu; 
University of Hawaii Press, 2002).
21 Stevan Harrell Ways o f Being Ethnic in Southwest China (Seattle: University of Washington Press, Z001).
22 The Chinese director Chen Kaige has once said: "Many would say the Cultural Revolution has destroyed Chinese 
culture since numerous cultural relics were destroyed. However, intellectually, it was more a time when the values 
inherent in traditional Chinese culture were carried to a dangerous extreme. This was violently reflected in the 
behaviour of every individual —  from their blind worship of the leader/emperor figure to the total desecration and 
condemnation of individual rights, These are mere repetitions of tradition." Quoted in Rey Chow, Primitive Passions. 
Visuality, Sexuality, Ethnography, and Contemporary Chinese Cinema (New York: Columbia University Press, 1995)
regional， historically grown cultures by reinscribing the official discourse of back- 
ward otherness with their own stories about poor hinterland peasants, members of 
ethnic minorities or abused women in terms of subalternized subjects as us, not them. 
Set up against the revolutionary grand narratives of landlord exploitation or red army 
sacrificial victories as well as the derivative romanticism or abstract experimentalism 
of earlier urban modernists, and inspired by the magical realism of G.G. Marquez, 
these tales explored the particular characteristics of Chinafs different regional cultures, 
including local myths, folktales, customs and beliefs. They also searched for a new 
form of nation-building based on a reformed, positive value system that would mirror 
a liberal acknowledgment of the nation's suppressed or forgotten traditions and the 
vigour of peoples used to enduring extreme hardships.
Among other early examples like Laojing^： ^- (Old Well) (1987), Haizi wang^ M, 
子王 (ffing o f fte CMdreu) (1987), and Hong ■紅高粱 CRec/ (1987)，
the co-production tudi 黃 土 地 （Yel/owE'ar比）（1984) by Chen Kaige 陳觀歌 as
director-actor and Zhang Yimou 張藝謀 as cinematographer reflects a new approach 
to art as critical intervention into the nation's grand narratives that previously had 
been built on an ideological agenda without much, if any, interest in the particular 
local realities. The criticism was all the more persuasive as it was uttered by zhiqing 
representatives who had been out there long enough to know about the difference. The 
film contrasts the fantastic tales and enthusiastic feasts of singing and dancing from 
the revolutionary centre Yan’an 延安  with the down-to-earth， disconsolate songs and 
epics as well as the sinister marriage rites of one of China's poorest peasant regions. 
The main protagonists — a red army soldier, who functions as both story collector 
and storyteller, and a young peasant girl， who wants to sing and dance at Yan’an in- 
stead of getting married to an old villager — are positioned in this scenario as seduced 
believers who share a dream of worldly paradise until reality tragically proves its very 
impossibility. The soldier, the peasant girl and her little brother embody the national 
hope for a better future, but as the adult agents both fail, only the little boy temporarily 
disrupts the film's atmosphere of total disenchantment. In the final sequence, he is 234
23 For a more sophisticated theoretical engagement with the film's messages see Chow, Primitive Passions. Visuality, 
Sexuality, Ethnography, and Contemporary Chinese Cinema 79-107.
24 Yomi Braester gives a summary of critical positions and an in-depth reading of Yu Hua 余華’s fictional engagement 
with the various, contesting theories of historical time and aesthetic concepts of the past in the framework of 
xungen revisionism. See Braester, "The Aesthetics and Anesthetics of Memory: PRC Avant-Garde Fiction," Witness 
Against Histofy, Literature, Film, and Public Discourse in Twentieth-Century China (Stanford: Stanford University 
Press, 2003) 177-191. However, as will be tackled in the following, I disagree with his standard periodization of 
xungen production as limited to only one decade (ca. 1985-1995),
shown to be engaged in a lonely and desperate struggle against the overpowering 
stream of a shamanistic rain-making procession in order to meet the soldier, who is 
returning too late to save the girl's life.23
Leading observers have located the essence of the cultural turn of the mid-80s in 
a profound criticism of the manufactured， isolated revolutionary cultural production 
and a simultaneous endeavour to catch up with global aesthetic trends as a moderniz­
ing strategy. However, both aims do not fully explain the vivid interest in China's 
ancient regional cultures of novelists as well as filmmakers.24 What， among
others, Rey Chow has identified as anti-modernist aesthetic primitivism, and the politi­
cal establishment for some time watched unamusedly as a seemingly reactionary trend, 
can indeed be seen as the formative stage of a large-scale intellectual reorientation 
towards a democratic integration of all subjects into the cultural imaginary of the 
nation. While revolutionary as well as early post-Maoist conceptions of culture were 
critically focused on aspects of rigid control and terror, the authors of search-for-roots 
tales gradually opened a perspective on its complementary dynamic and empowering 
aspects. The possibility of new ideas about social change, which according to Western 
hermeneutical theories can be anticipated and experimentally enacted in the world of 
fiction and arts,25 seems to have been perceived by the post-Maoist generation of cul­
tural producers as a chance to limit the terror of macrosocial mismanagement based 
on empty ideological speculations of the communist type. In films like Yellow Earth, 
Old Well, King o f the Children, and Red Sorghum, members of the educated urban 
youth are configured as either rooted in’ or at least assimilated to the countryside, with 
a more or less clear mission to assist the peasants in their construction of, or adapta­
tion to one common and unilinear future. There still remains, therefore, a pedagogical 
distance that marks a boundary line between he who knows and teaches and those 
who are being taught. However, this line was rapidly torn down in several outstanding 
minority feature films like Tian Zhuangzhuang 田另士另士's Daoumzei 盜馬賊（The/Jorse 
TM的 （1985) and Zhang Nuanxin 張暖衍 ，s QingchuzyY青 春 祭 （Sacrifee o f  Fout/i) 
(1985), and is even more absent in later ethnographic tales.26 Likewise, the de-historicized, 
atemporal representations of peripheral cultures that are still characteristic of most 
root-searching narratives are now being abandoned in favour of more flexible attempts 
to come to terms with the problematique of a simultaneous presence of new and old
25 Hans-Georg Gadamer, Truth and Method (New York: Crossroad, 1982).
26 On The Horse Thief, see Dru Gladney, "Tian Zhuangzhuang, the Fifth Generation, and Minorities Film in China," 4 
October 2003 < www.hawaii.edu/dru/horsethief.htm>; on Sacrifice ofYouth, see Gladey, "Representing Nationality in 
China: Refiguring Majority/Minority Identities," 4 October 2003 <www,hawaii/dru/exotic.htm>.
disintegrating tendencies in contemporary "national" country life.
Blurred Boundaries, Precarious Transgressions ^
In Zhang Nuanxin's movie, the young heroine arrives in a remote southern D a i#  
community as a Han stranger, but soon changes her clothes to dress in the fashion of 
a Dai girl. Her new dress code clearly signifies a development in her concept of identity. 
Accordingly, the story's climax positions her in a triangle of love, where she is con­
fronted with having to choose between an educated Han and a peasant Dai man. Her 
decision to leave both of them behind and take a teacher's job in a rural elementary 
school mirrors her newly acquired non-identity: neither the plain, liberally sensuous 
Dai lifestyle that is constantly threatened by the forces of nature, nor the superior- 
minded Han culture, which demands from all of its subjects a high degree of submis­
sion to a relentlessly disciplining state power, can win her over. Much has been said 
about the statist Han ideology of the beautiful naked minority woman that seemingly 
is also permeating this movie; however, in this case the discourse is employed as a 
vehicle to make a reverse statement. Ethnic otherness is represented here as equal, if 
not 一 in certain respects — superior to Han culture. Therefore, it must not be 
disciplined, but rather properly negotiated in a truly multi-ethnic nation. If there are 
no categories for cross-cultural negotiation yet， as in the main protagonist’s case， the 
experience of cultural difference at least causes a thorough and critical revision of 
Han values. This message appears to be outstandingly daring in that epoch's cinemato­
graphic and literary fields. But Tian Zhuangzhuang, with his movie The Horse Thief, 
has launched an even more radical attack on Han elitism. As he himself has once 
informed, the young Tibetan, who is a not only a horse thief, but also a devoted son, 
husband and father, as well as an outstandingly capable member of the community,27 28
falls victim to his people's fear of the gods. This makes him a signifier of the victims 
of the Cultural Revolution that had sacrificed innumerable subjects of the Chinese
27 Here, my argument takes a distinctly different direction from Gladney's. I am not sure whether Gladney has seen 
another version of the film, or simply disregards the non-discursive messages of the movie, but this problem 
deserves further reflection elsewhere. For the general line of this discussion, I am very indebted to Gladney's 
readings of the Chinese minority films,
28 Karsten Kruger, Exotische Landschaften und ethnische Grenzzonen —  Die Nationalen Minderheiten (shaoshu 
minzu) Chinas im Film. Zur Probiematik fiimischer Reprasentations — und Authetizitatsstrategien am Beispiel des 
fruhen chinesischen ethnographischert Dokumentarfilms [Exotic Landscapes and Ethinc Grey Areas — National 
Minorities in Chinese Film, Concerning the Problem o f Cinematic Strategies for Representation —  and Authenticity 
in Early Chinese Ethnographic Documentary Films] (1957-1966), (Frankfurt/M. & London: IKO Verlag fur 
Interkulturelle Kommunikation, 2003),
nation to equally irrational moral principles. In terms of style, the movie parodistically 
alludes to the genre of the Maoist documentary film that had flourished during the 
60s. Those earlier films, in an ideologically overdetermined way, had set out to inform 
the (Han) masses about the backwardness and primitiveness of their not yet liberated 
brothers and sisters out there. While they， like the minority movies of the 80s， had 
promoted ethnic exoticism by stressing the most gruesome, irrational and grotesque 
aspects of the cultures at the margins,28 they had done it for quite different reasons, as 
the movies of the 80s argue for an inclusion based on the acknowledgement of cul­
tural alterities, and not for a politics of surmounting them through homogenization 
(which means Hanification).
Tian, by drawing his daring analogy between the barbarisms of primitive 
survival and civilized modernity, has implemented a strategy of blurred bound­
aries that questions many long-cherished convictions, such as the superiority of 
rational, analytical modes of thinking, our capability of moral judgment, or the 
objectivity of the ethnographer's gaze. At the same time, his movie forces global 
viewers into an awkward position. Because this kind of analogical perception al­
lows an opening of the scenario far beyond the Han-Zang site, we, as media spec­
tators of historical events like the Cultural Revolution, are equally addressed. In 
fact, we are invited to look back and question the realism of our own strategies of 
reality perception. It is in this context that the much-disputed concept of orientalism 
can be quite helpful: Far from simply being the result of an attitude of uneasy 
disguise and search for the legitimization o f oppressive colonial politics, it can be 
consciously and actively employed by critical storytellers as a symbolic commit­
ment that unveils the purpose and ideological foundations of beautiful, elaborate 
cultural performances. This argument contains a defence of movies that have been 
critically singled out for consumerist self-orientalism, like Zhang Yimou's Da hong 
大紅燈蘢高高掛  CRaise t h e L a n t e r n )  or Jucfou 菊豆，on 
the grounds of their engagement with the unquestionable facticity of locally spe­
cific forms of violence that experience continuous legitimization and enactment 
through cultural practice. As we all, as media spectators, get more and more ex­
posed to visual images of the various, locally specific barbarisms, we for once 
experience true globalism in a shared crisis of orientation. Whether or not audi­
ences react to the orientalist appeal, step out of the vicious circle of self-congratu­
latory habits and, instead of simply gazing at the primitivity of the represented 
others with lecherous contempt, identify by drawing their own analogies, is not (or 
no longer) predominantly the storytellers' business.
Vexed Voices of Concern: The Question of Meaning in Ethnic Representations
The complexity of daily life is rapidly increasing in our age of virtual, or hyper 
reality (as described by media theorists like Baudrillard, Virilio, and others), and, to­
gether with this uncanny growth, its global, deterritorialized cultural forms and our 
theorizing efforts tend to become more and more precarious. The fallacies, surprises 
and latent possibilities of intercultural communication can best be seen in a debate on 
recent Tibetan history between two concerned intellectuals of differently hyphenated 
cultural backgrounds. In spring 2002, the Chinese dissident writer Wang Lixiong 王力 
published his interpretation of a case of blurred boundaries in Sino-Tibetan his­
tory that so far had been carefully avoided by both Chinese and Tibetan historians. 
With a careful analysis he hoped to shed light on the cultural questions at stake,
[when] at the height o f the Cultural Revolution hundreds of thousands of Tibet­
ans turned upon the temples they had treasured for centuries and tore them to 
pieces, rejected their religion and became zealous followers of the Great Han 
occupier, Mao Zedong. To the Chinese Communist Party, the episode is part o f a 
social catastrophe —  one that it initiated but has long since disowned and which, 
it hopes, the rest of the world will soon forget. For the Tibetan participants, the 
memory of that onslaught is a bitter humiliation, one they would rather not talk 
about, or which they try to exorcise with the excuse that they only did it "under 
pressure from the Han .'1 Foreign critics simply refuse to accept that the episode 
ever took place, unable to imagine that the Tibetans could willingly and consciously 
have done such a thing.29
By applying what he considered to be objective criteria in his project of excava­
tion of a secret history, Wang found three paradigms to explain the phenomenon and 
its unfavourable effects on contemporary Tibetan society. First, the traditional Tibetan 
society's strong fear of the gods (for which he believes he has found good reasons), 
second, the local religious belief in a rotation of the gods, and third, the post-Maoist 
politics of Tibetanization as a strategy of redressing the wrongs. Their harsh natural 
environment, Wang argues, forced Tibetans into a strong belief in fate, which was 
seen as determined by occasionally rotating divine powers. Thus, Mao came to be seen 
as successor to a previous incarnation of a very powerful god, that is, as a victorious 
concurrent of the Dalai Lama. This logic， Wang believes， explains why Tibetans will­
29 Wang Lixiong, "Reflections on Tibet," A/eiA//.e^/?e\//evi/14 March-April 2002,3  August Z003 < www.newieftreview. 
net/NLR24805.html>.
ingly tore down Buddhist temples and rebuilt them as shrines to Mao and the victori­
ous god he impersonated. When the Party later decided to turn away from its politics 
of forcible secularization and even actively supported the restoration of temples that 
it had destroyed before, it meant an admission of charismatic weakness, which in turn 
reinforced the religious zeal of the Tibetans who now found themselves guilty of blas­
phemy and made every effort to appease their temporarily abandoned gods.
In summer 2002, the native Tibetan Tsering Shakya, currently Research Fellow 
in Tibetan Studies at the London School of Oriental and African Studies, retorted that 
Wang's ideas are spurred less by a desire to understand Tibetan history and culture 
and to help stabilize its contemporary society, than by a deeply internalized colonialist 
attitude of the Chinese intelligentsia, who cannot imagine Tibetans otherwise than 
servile and stupid. Since Chinese revolutionaries did not even understand their own 
religious attitudes towards Mao and the revolution, he went on, they of course were 
even less prepared to understand the agenda behind the destructive energy of Tibet­
ans who were supervised by armed Red Guards. Had those Tibetans at that moment 
been given a voice to utter their genuine feelings, their reports would have sounded 
very different from what either Red Guards or Wang Lixiong imagined them to be. It 
looks like the failure of Wang Lixiong's well-intentioned hermeneutic effort is in line 
with the Chinese literary critic Wang Fei's attempt to understand the strange Tibetan 
tales of the Sino-Tibetan author Zhaxi Dawa that were written between 1986 and 1990— 
tales that he felt attracted to but apparently did not find appropriate categories to 
theorize about. His interpretation of the tale that lent the title to Zhaxi Dawa's anthology, 
X!•说n私 yfnm_sufyx记 西 藏 ，隱秘歲月（Tibet, The Hidden CixTOJik:)， which he under- 
stands as a eulogy of the modernizing spirit of the Tibetan people, in particular shows 
disturbing inconsistencies with the narrative logic of the tale proper. As Wang Fei 
tries to explain away these inconsistencies by alluding to a stereotypically mysterious 
Tibet, his error mirrors what Tsering Shakya has to say of Wang Lixiong's 
misperception, since by doing so Wang Fei seems to assume that, if there are any 
deficiencies of logic, they must necessarily reside in the Tibetan authors text, but not 
in his own reading of it.30 The critic may very well have overlooked the possibility that 
the mystery has been created more by his particular type of hermeneutics (and the 
historical formation of the discourse of a radically mysterious Tibet), than by the 
alien country or the storyteller himself.
The solution to such fallible conceptualization seems to lie in contesting, multi- 
generic representations of events and contexts that can be analysed in a cross-cultural
30 Zhaxi Dawa, Xizangyinmi suiyue (Wuhan: Chancyiang wenyi chubanshe, 1993).
as well as interdisciplinary dialogue. Contrary to the historian or ethnographer, writ­
ers and filmmakers, in their function as narrators of fictional stories, do not usually 
tell, or claim to tell, what is true, but what is probable. In their narration, they do not 
search for the most straightforward way to make their argument， but very often use 
equivocal symbols. Since the 90s, they moreover consciously withdraw from the posi­
tion of the knowledgeable narrator, and especially do not claim to be their rural or 
ethnic protagonists1 pedagogical guides. Rather, they have become aware of the inde­
pendence of all represented worlds from their own culturally conditioned experiential 
horizon and what they and their readers may perceive as reality. Many contemporary 
cultural producers have therefore given up the claim of authority over their cre­
ation—like Yu Hua who once said that, while writing, he always needs to listen
to what his protagonists want to say, and that he always needs to be careful to follow 
their 〇"wn ideas about events.31 What these storytellers produce is， in other words, a 
kind of simulated ethnographic fieldwork. Conducted in the fictional realm, their en­
gagement with literary anthropology may enable us to get a clearer concept about the 
ways in which people/others make meaning within their personal experiential realms, 
and how they rearrange their cultural heritage in order to solve new problems. Like 
Mira Nair’s fiction camera， Chinese narrators — whether cinematographic or literary — 
since the 80s have embarked on a large-scale exploration of the fictional constructs of 
those who dwell on the fringes of society. I suggest that this is not primarily because 
they s仕ive to reassure themselves about their own central position and superiority， 
but rather because those other agents/subjectivities, who have remained voiceless even 
under the light of the scientific ethnographers' documentary gaze, need their creative 
support in order to finally gain a voice of their own. "I felt that a fiction camera could 
get into these otherwise out of bounds spaces much, much better than a hidden cam­
era would," commented woman cinematographer Mira Nair some time ago.32
Conclusion
In a way, the new fictional ethnographic inquiry can be seen as a strategy of 
class empowerment. Those post-Maoist intellectuals who found themselves relegated 
to a class of subaltern subjects by Mao, now understandably do not continue to teach, 
but rather form (imaginary) allies with the nation's traditional subaltern groups, which 
include women, children, minority people and poor peasants. In their representations,
31 My unpublished interview with Yu Hua in summer 1999.
32 Gwendolyn Audrey Foster, Women Filmmakers o f the African and Asian Diaspora. Decolonizing the Gaze, 
Locating Subjectivities (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1997) 119,
they prefer to write back so as to defy exclusive Party authority and the paradigm of 
national homogeneity. That this is not the only, arguably not even the most important 
agenda, can be derived from a contextualized reading of Zhang Yimou's national epos 
Yingxiong (Hero) in the hermeneutic frame of minority discourse. While in his 
1999 movie Y^e dou bu shao —個都不能少 （iVot One Less)， the hero had been a 
little peasant girl who was outstandingly successful where much more powerful adults 
had failed, namely in bringing modernization and economic capital into her village, 
Hero once again is a representation of the most refined and morally exemplary cul­
tural elite of the nation. However, the protagonists are shown in the end to unite in a 
public rite of self-annihilation in order to admonish, and simultaneously support, the 
state authorities. While the minority discourse — as has been argued above — in a 
new, and dangerously apolitical layer of meaning is now being used by Han officials to 
sell the nation to foreign tourists,33 and the traditional national vernaculars of the cul­
tural borderline between north and south, or Qin ^-and Chu once again engage in 
open confrontation, concerned intellectuals raise their voices to warn about increas­
ingly harmful forms of fragmentation and warlordism in the provinces.34 Meanwhile, 
the storytellers' fiction camera wanders about looking for a foundation of the house of 
China's peoples that can be more solid than ideology, power or money. In their view, it 
is not enough for their aesthetic production to provide vernaculars for the deconstruction 
of empty, legitimizing discourses and the concrete agonies of the nation's traumatized 
subjects. If China wants to develop a modern society, its out-of-bound spaces and ac- 
tors must be fully recognized as participant players in their own rights. Hopefully, 
their soft revolution of poetic paradigms will persuade the political players to trans­
late them into social reality.
33 Todd Munson, "Selling China: www.cnta.com and Cultural Nationalism," 10 April 2003 <www,albany,edu/jmmh/ 
vol2no1/chinaweb,html>.
34 Susan Blum and Lionel Jensen, eds, China Off Center, Mapping the Margins o f the Middle Kingdom (Honolulu: 
University of Hawaii Press, 2002).
